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FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**ZAPU'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING THE WAR OF LIBERATION FROM
1961 UP TO 1979.**

BY

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Approval form

The undersigned certify that they have and recommended to the Midlands State University for acceptance. A dissertation entitled: **ZAPU’S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING THE WAR OF LIBERATION FROM 1961 UP TO 1979.** In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in History.

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Declaration.

I the undersigned Sibanda Davis, hereby admit that this dissertation is my own original work and that it has been submitted and will not be presented at any other university for a similar or any other similar award.

Signature

date

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Dedication.

I dedicate this dissertation to my sister Agnes Makwiti and Beatrice Mlambo.

Acknowledgements.

Firstly I would like to express my gratitude to God almighty for giving me the ideas and strength to start and complete this dissertation. I would not have achieved it without him.

I am genuinely appreciative to my supervisor for working with me throughout the course of this project. I am most grateful for his dedication and advice, I am much indebted to him.

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List of acronyms.

AA.....African Association.

AAPSO.....Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation.

AAPC.....All-African People’s Conference.

ACOA.....American Committee on Africa.

AAI.....African-American Institute.

AFLCIO.....American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisation.

OAU.....Organisation of African Unity.

UN.....United Nations.

INC.....Indian National Congress.

UNIP.....United National Independence Party.

SRANC.....Southern Rhodesia African National Congress.

NDP.....National Democratic Party.

PF ZAPU....Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People’s Union.

ZPRA.....Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army.

ZANU PF....Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.

ZANLA.....Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.

NR.....Northern Rhodesia.

SR.....Southern Rhodesia.

Nyasaland....Malawi.

SA.....South Africa.

USA.....United States of America.

USSR.....United Soviet Socialists Republic.

ANC.....African National Congress.

ANC.....African National Council.

UANC.....United African National Council.

MK.....Umkhonto WeSizwe/ Spear of the Nation.

SWAPO.....South West African Peoples Organisation.

MPLA.....The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

FRELIMO.....Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.

PLO.....Palestine Liberation Organisation.

PAIGC.....African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

FLS.....Front Line States.

NSO.....National Security Organisation.

GDR.....Germany Democratic Republic.

SD.....Smart District.

NGOs.....Non-Governmental Organisations.

FROLIZI.....Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.

ZIPA.....Zimbabwe People’s Army.

PF.....Patriotic Front.

SIDA.....Swedish International Development Aid/ Agency.

PAFMECSA...Pan-African Freedom Movement for East Central and Southern Africa.

ZNP.....Zimbabwe National Party.

Abstract.

This study focuses on ZAPU's diplomatic relations during the war of liberation. It strives at capturing external players that were not well documented in the historical narratives of Zimbabwe's history of liberation. The study traces the origins of ZAPU's diplomatic relations and the impact of these diplomatic relations in the manner through which ZAPU became portrayed as an authentic liberation movement due to the ability to craft sophisticated soft power. The study further looks at the wide range of diplomatic assistance that ZAPU received from various sympathisers which the party had established intricate diplomatic relations with. The research also projects out the nature of ZAPU's interactions with its allies at different phases of liberation struggle. It also assesses the impact of diplomatic relations on the outcome of the liberation struggle. ZAPU's diplomatic relations enabled the party to be equipped with weapons of mass destructions which were in commensurate with weapons of the enemy. ZAPU's diplomatic relations strengthened its military wing ZPRA to partial invisibility which threatened Smith's resistance to grant Africans their independence and eventual succumbed to the pressure as victory was becoming certain for guerrilla forces. ZAPU's diplomatic relations also buttresses ZAPU's genuine commitment to the liberation struggle which in many cases has been deliberate undermined so as to justify ZANU dominance and legitimize its leadership. The study demythologises such tailor made historical narratives on the liberation struggle and sheds light of a balanced representative history of the liberation struggle. ZAPU's diplomatic relations with OAU and the Frontline States are also discussed as these bodies were extensively involved in the day to day politics of Zimbabwe's liberation movements. The study will be constructed using both primary and secondary sources and a qualitative method will be used in writing of this thesis.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

Introduction:

The study is located within the domain of liberation war-history particularly the diplomatic history of the liberation war movements. It seeks to analyse diplomatic history of ZAPU, with other countries as well as other liberation movements during the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. The field of Liberation movements has flourished over the past five years. However, there has been a dearth of literature and research on aspects concerning the diplomatic history of national liberation of Zimbabwe particularly diplomatic history of ZAPU. Hence, the study stands to lower the lacunar in current research and scholarship and also to demythologise liberation narratives that are current at disposal and taught in the educational institutions within the country. These narratives have an enormous degree of bias which are being told from the victor's perspective. The part played by the ZANU PF in the liberation of Zimbabwe has been unashamedly emphasised to a heroic magnitude such that one gets the impression that ZANU PF was the only nationalist party that actually took the Rhodesian government head on in the struggle. ZAPU's contribution and its intricate diplomatic relations with other countries that assisted her to effectively participate in the armed struggle are downplayed.

Historical background.

Amongst the authentic liberation movements that were recognised by the OAU and UN in Southern Africa ZAPU was also included. Mazarire states that, these authentic and prominent liberation movement consisted of ZAPU of Zimbabwe, ANC of South Africa, SWAPO of Namibia, MPLA of Angola and FRELIMO of Mozambique.¹ This afforded ZAPU an active and effective opportunity to participate in diplomatic relations with other countries both in Africa and other continents as it was legal observed as an authentic liberation weapon. Due to the wave of change in the international politics that sorted to grant African countries their

independence under the auspices of the vanguard of UN, a platform of communication for liberation movement was established. Gebe believes that this had a significant impact on the aspects of diplomatic relations for liberation movements, he says that, the presence of subnational entities representing peoples aspiring to statehood and the creation of radically different regimes in their homelands which condemned colonialism like the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ANC and SWAPO which had an observer status at the UN.² He further alludes that, PLO had membership in the Arab League and envoys in most of the world's capitals, many with diplomatic status, gave opportunity for other liberation movement to establish diplomatic relations with other countries in their liberation struggle.³ The intensification of Pan-Africanism as an idea of fighting the evil legacies of colonialism also galvanised African states to work in solidarity despite the boundaries that distinguished them. Gabe stipulates that, in the fifty congress of 1945, held in Manchester England were a number of African representatives had attended, a plethora of significant aspirations and concerns were voiced. Most importantly the congress advocated for the complete independence of the African continent and total rejection of colonialism and exploitation in its all forms.⁴ Nkomo believes that, the formation of OAU in May 25 in 1963, spearheaded the decolonisation doctrine further and intensified the interaction of liberation movements with leaders of independent countries. Geographical boundaries were now breached.⁵ This enabled ZAPU to carry and establish sophisticated diplomatic relations with other African countries in the cause for liberty of Zimbabwe. Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders could easily meet with other African leaders and advocates of African independence to negotiate and discuss issues of liberation thereby establishing viable diplomatic bonds.

When ZAPU was formed, they prominently advocated for Africans' self-rule. Nyangoni argues that, ZAPU's worth at its establishment was that it became the first movement for Africans in Rhodesia to make use of the impressions of imperialism and Pan-Africanism

within the liberation struggle.⁶ This was now language that was spoken across the African continent and across the international board. From then on, the struggle for the liberation of the African people in Southern Rhodesia was presented and spoken of in terms that resonated with the general struggle for independence which various oppressed and marginalized peoples were taking up. As such, the Africans in Southern Rhodesia identified with and drew inspiration from other countries which had just got their independence. Nyangoni stipulates that, ZAPU should be permitted to take tribute for the internationalization of the Southern Rhodesia crisis by seeking to speak the etymology of the United Nations in the advancement of human rights.⁷ ZAPU managed to put the struggle of Southern Rhodesia on an international scene. Thompson concurs with Nyangoni, she believes that, the internationalization of the Rhodesian crisis gave the liberation movement an opportunity to cooperate with other anti-colonial forces in the world.⁸ ZAPU's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments made her a voice that spoke the language of liberation that many African nationalists were speaking at the time. Nyangoni avers that, Nkomo spelt out the need for diplomatic relations for ZAPU. These were, the immediate fight against colonialism while collaborating with international establishments backing up the struggle.⁹ The idea of the liberating Zimbabwe by making use of means outside the precincts of Southern Rhodesia was embraced by ZAPU from the time of its formation. ZAPU did not regard the struggle for the liberation as an isolated case.¹⁰ They adopted the liberation struggle at a wider spectrum through engaging external forces. Hence this thesis will focus much on the diplomatic relations that ZAPU established. This will help the researcher to establish the intricate diplomatic relations that ZAPU had with other nations which made her a powerful weapon in liberation of the nation.

Statement of problem.

The basic assumption on the liberation-history is that, armed struggle was fought solely on the capacity on the liberation movements. Therefore the significant contribution of diplomatic relations has been effectively side-lined in the liberation narratives. Sibanda argues that, the liberation narratives have been unscientifically and simplistically written, writers project colonialisation typified by Ian Smith was the villain, Robert Mugabe spearheaded the war against entrenched racism and became the hero.¹¹ Most historical liberation narratives have been turned into a ZANU and ZANLA conquering affair, while the role of ZAPU and ZPRA is erased from the face of the earth. This has scientifically collapsed the history of liberation struggle into one man band. In an attempt to erase ZAPU's effective participation in the armed struggle, ZAPU and ZPRA's outstanding diplomatic relations became inadequately captured. Its heroic contributions have been reduced to anti-heroes at every opportunity. It has been a tendency by historians to give much credit and extensive appreciation of the roles contributed by religious leaders in the liberation struggle, project immense contribution of peasants and urban workers in supporting the armed struggle. Thereby reducing the influence of diplomatic relations in the liberation struggle. Much information on the aspects and pivotal role that was played by engagement in diplomatic relations has been awarded a less status.

Significance of the study.

The study provides an immense contribution that was made by ZAPU into the liberation struggle through its intricate diplomatic relations. The exploration will help to profit research analyst for easy access to eloquent information that is currently not at easy disposal for scholars to access. It will also add value in the development of a two-fold history of the liberation struggle as it strives at capturing the omitted and forgotten historical narratives thereby reconciling the history of the armed struggle of Zimbabwe. Moreover, this research will benefit the whole nation as it is committed to the philosophies that guide intellectual

enterprise, nation building and patriotism, through unearthing of omitted actors in the history of national liberation.

Justification of the study.

The study stretches from 1961-79 because that is when ZAPU was formed and existed as a liberation political entity. Upon its formation the party instantly reinforced and expanded the diplomatic relations which were already established by its predecessor parties. ZAPU engaged diplomatic relations throughout the liberation war. ZAPU managed to effectively internationalise the Zimbabwean crisis hence this will provide a clear picture of countries that ZAPU representatives approached and gained support from their early stages of campaigning for the armed struggle. As early as in 1962 ZAPU had some of its cadres trained in countries like Ghana and some in China. By 1965 the impact of diplomatic relations was now seen. In 1964 Zambia gained her independence and thereby provided ZAPU with bases for training their cadres, it also provided ZAPU with offices to coordinate, establish communication with other countries for help, plan, and facilitate its recruitment program as well as shelter for people who ran away from the Smith government either for training or seeking refuge. Worth noting is the fact that, by mid to late-sixties guerrilla activities had started operating and they did not take place in a vacuum, there were partly possible due to the existence of diplomatic relations, guns were now at the disposal of freedom fighters for example Egypt, the first supplier of guns had supplied Nkomo with weapons which made its way to Zambia as early as 1962 and continued with its supplies throughout the episode of liberation war. Also OAU by 1963, had made available training bases for liberation movement in Tanzania which ZAPU had some of its first cadres trained there before establishing an entry point for its military wing. At this point ZAPU managed to maintain her stance of armed struggle regardless of Smith stiffened opposition to armed struggle activities.

Research Objectives.

1. To trace the origins and development of diplomatic relations and reasons why ZAPU was recognised as an authentic liberation movement.
2. To analyse the role played by the diplomatic community to the armed struggle.
3. To examine the impact of diplomatic relations in the armed struggle.
4. To unearth the nature of diplomatic relations between ZAPU and regional bodies.

Research Questions.

1. Why was ZAPU recognised as an authentic liberation movement by OAU?
2. What role did diplomatic relations play in the armed struggle?
3. What was the impact of these diplomatic relations both on internal and international scene?
4. How were the regional bodies able to assist ZAPU during the war of liberation?

Literature Review.

Armed struggle as a liberation tactic, became espoused as the appropriate strategy of liberation after exhausting all nonviolent possibilities of political communication. Colonial racists' governments blocked all the avenues of peacefully interaction with the Africans aspiring for their independence. As such Africans were constrained to organise themselves into armed liberation movement. Despite having plenty literature on liberation history of Southern Africa, in particular liberation of Zimbabwe, the capture of diplomatic history of ZAPU during the liberation war has not been well addressed. Few scholars have addressed ZAPU's diplomatic history, however little has been said. Therefore the visited sources will assist in demystifying and construction of ZAPU's diplomatic history during the war of liberation. Aquino de Braganca asserts that, liberation movements received countless forms of support, local, regional and international as has been the case with Southern Africa.¹³

However, most produced historical narratives strongly concentrate on assistance the liberation movement obtained local. He goes on to say, external these liberation movements managed to establish intricate diplomatic relations which enabled them to access material support and humanitarian aid mostly from the OAU Liberation committee, nonaligned nations and from the USSR, China and other socialist countries as well as the Scandinavian countries.¹⁴ His writings will be greatly useful in the construction ZAPU's diplomatic history during the armed struggle.

Narrating from a Eurocentric standpoint, M Morris provided a comprehensive account of the armed struggle in Southern Africa. He traced the armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia and highlighted the failures of liberation forces by providing numerical losses of guerrillas. Morris presents a biased account on the liberation of Southern Africa. He labelled liberation movement as terrorists organisation.¹⁵ He also attributed hundreds of death of civilian population in Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to these terrorists groups.¹⁶ By chronicling an inaccurate account, Morris justified colonialism in Africa and unashamed discredited African liberation movements. Morris work denounces the impact of diplomatic relations. Norma Kriger, over zealously romanticised the contribution of peasants on the armed struggle. Her historical narratives portrays peasants as the major contributory factor in making the armed struggle successful. She quotes Mao famous teachings, 'soldiers are the fish and masses are the water 'as such the fish cannot survive outside water.'¹⁷ As such she systematically side-lined the fundamental potency of diplomatic relations contribution on the liberation struggle as she dwells much on peasants. Jokonya narrates how the execution of the Rhodesia scorched earth policy displaced hundreds of peasants who ultimately became internal displaced persons and refuges in neighbouring countries.¹⁸ By clarifying the effects of the armed struggle on rural societies in Zimbabwe. Jokonya helps in analysing diplomatic relations between Zambia and ZAPU, as this explains the origins of thousands of

Zimbabwean refugees who settled in Zambia during the armed struggle. Martin and Johnson examine the history of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle from a ZANU perspective. Their historical narrative was deliberate meant to undermine ZAPU's significant involvement in war, Martin and Johnson's projected ZANU as the vanguard of the liberation struggle and Robert Mugabe as a heroic leader in the liberation of Zimbabwe.¹⁹ As such their writing fails to capture ZAPU's intricate soft power it engaged in the armed struggle.

Sibanda provides a historical narrative from a ZAPU's perspective and its contribution towards the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. Sibanda's counters Martin and Johnson narratives which he believes were sponsored by the government dominated by ZANU which led to them to write the history of liberation ZANU playing the leading role and perhaps the only bona fide liberation movement.²⁰ However, one needs to consult other sources to validate this research. His narrative projects complex and intricate diplomatic relations that ZAPU had to ensure the achievement of independence of Zimbabwe. Fay Chung discredits the significant contribution of Zambia's diplomatic support in the liberation struggle. She believes that Zambia existed to undermine the survival of ZANU. This is premised on the attempt by the Zambian government to disarm ZANU for its political stability and peace, and its subsequently expulsion from Zambia to Mozambique due to refusal to disarm.²¹ Chung a strong follower of ZANU attempts to downplay significant contribution of diplomatic relations that ZANU had with Zambia, indirect and direct she acknowledges the complex and sophisticated diplomatic relations that ZAPU had with Zambia throughout the liberation struggle as she asserts that the Zambian president was strongly interested on the survival of ZAPU and supported ZAPU whole hearted than ZANU.²² Though Chung's narrative is misplaced, her narrative will help in guiding this research.

Carol Thompson contributes immensely on the diplomatic relations of ZAPU with the Front Line States. She clearly shows the countries that ZAPU had diplomatic relations with and the

significant role they played in the liberation struggle by offering a twofold of diplomatic assistance to ZAPU. She views the Front Line States as the mouth piece and earpiece of ZAPU at regional and international level.²³ However, Thompson focus on the role played by the Front Line States, thereby leaving out diplomatic relations of ZAPU with other African countries that were not part of the FLS as well as the diplomatic relations of ZAPU with other continents.

Again this study benefits largely from Sellostrom's narratives on the role of Scandinavian countries in liberation of Southern Africa in particular Sweden's role. Sellostrom's volume II discusses the role of Sweden in the liberation of Southern Africa. It shows what kind of support ZAPU received from 1970-1980. Sellostrom asserts that, Sweden supplied southern African liberation movements extensively with humanitarian aid.²⁴ This shall assist greatly in exploring the nature of diplomatic relations that ZAPU had with the Nordic states. Equally important, Eriksen's chronicles on the contribution of the Norwegians in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa will be useful as a guideline. He also comments on humanitarian aid that ZAPU obtained from the Norwegians. His contribution will be heavily significant in the construction of ZAPU's diplomatic relations with Nordic states. Bhebe and Ranger note that, the major studies of the war from an African perspective do not deal with armies or military tactics or the experience of fighting men and women.²⁵ As such they dwelt more on armies and their areas of operation as well as their military tactics. Partly this makes them to highlight how these military tactics were adopted there by introducing the aspects of diplomatic engagements. This will contribute to the research as it pictures out the impact of diplomatic relations in influencing the military strategies.

Bhebe brings out points of divergent and convergent between the two liberation movements. He brings out a striking point on the divergent of these two liberation movements. He argues that, their patterns of recruitment were different, ZANLA was more of a country-dweller

army whilst ZPRA could be described as a working-class army, in the sense that a high proportion of its staffing were straight from waged jobs in towns and or industry.²⁶ As such, ZPRA cadres were ductile and malleable to a plethora of formal military and technical training. This will help the researcher to establish the kind of military training ZPRA cadres received. ZAPU's nature also explains the party's ability to craft sophisticated diplomatic relations as the party had more educated people who could explicitly and eloquently present their decolonisation case.

Sources and research methodology.

This study utilised qualitative method to research on and evaluate the impact of ZAPU's diplomatic relations during the liberation struggle from 1961-79. This approach enabled the researcher to analyse the significance of ZAPU's diplomatic relations during the armed struggle. Key role players in ZAPU-ZPRA strata who served in the liberation movement were interviewed. As well as ZAPU-ZPRA cadres, ordinary citizens who witnessed the liberation struggle in foreign countries will also be interviewed especial those who were in countries that aided ZAPU-ZPRA cadres. The study extensively draws its information from both primary and secondary sources, published textbooks and journals on the liberation movement of Southern Africa were utilised.

Dissertation layout.

Introductory chapter- the chapter will consists of the summary of this whole dissertation. The purpose of the study, its background and also its significance. The information that was used to compile the piece of work which include secondary sources.

Chapter one- the chapter will discuss the origins of ZAPU's diplomatic relations. It will examine the nature of diplomatic relations of these first two pioneer political parties that were formed in Zimbabwe. It will also discuss the reasons why ZAPU was recognised as an

authentic liberation movement. Most importantly the Sino-Soviet split will help to show the criteria through which ZAPU attained a status of being regarded as an authentic liberation movement.

Chapter two- this chapter will discuss about the development of ZAPU's diplomatic relations from 1961-1969. It will show what kind of assistance ZAPU and its military wing obtained through the means of diplomatic relations. Most important this chapter shows the nature of interactions, how ZAPU basically got assistance. ZAPU-ZPRA relations with ANC-MK will also be analysed briefly. ZAPU's sour diplomatic relations will be also analysed.

Chapter three- this chapter will analyse the transformation of ZAPU's diplomatic relations after the 1969-71 ZAPU's internal conflict which had virtual led to a pause in ZAPU's war efforts as well as its diplomatic relations its allies. However, after their conflict resolution ZAPU took a new form of diplomatic relations. ZAPU's new military apparatus became more committed to war and made intensive changes and the scope of their diplomatic relations also deepened. The number of their cadres' increased, sophisticated weapons were also sort. These events were also partly influenced by successive failed negotiations between nationalist leaders and Smith regime which in turn compelled nationalist leaders to intensify the war. The chapter will be concluded by analysing the impact of engagement in diplomatic relations.

Chapter four- the chapter will analyse ZAPU diplomatic relations with OAU and FLS. It will show the significant contribution of these diplomatic relations both internal and external.

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CHAPTER ONE: THE GENESIS OF ZAPU'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

Introduction.

The chapter will begin by discussing the first political parties that were ZAPU's predecessors SRANC and NDP. It will discuss the scope of their formation as well as their diplomatic relations during their era of survival. These diplomatic relations laid foundation for ZAPU's diplomatic relations, as Nkomo and other ZAPU consuls strengthened them when ZAPU was formed. It will also discuss in brief why ZAPU was recognised as an authentic liberation movement by OAU. This chapter largely uses a representational approach to explore out SRANC and NDP diplomatic relations. It largely draws its information from Nkomo's autobiography, *The Story of my Life*, as it accounts most of Nkomo's political carrier in two fold both internal and external. This contributes invaluable information, as Nkomo remains a key figure for both parties. Nkomo's role of being an earpiece and mouth piece of these parties makes his work heavily relevant. It also draws its information from interviews as little information is available on secondary sources. Most significant the chapter in the long run will show countries, organisations and liberation movements that SRANC and NDP had diplomatic relations.

SRANC historical background.

SRANC, started surfacing into life as early as 1948, though at this particular point it was weak in nature it could appear and disappear. It was largely a regional entity, local it was referred to as ANC. This has made many scholars to start talking about SRANC, from 1957, after two local regional groupings namely ANC based in Bulawayo and the City Youth League based in Harare combined together in September, 1957, to form a new strong first nationalist party in Zimbabwe under the name of SRANC. It became more vibrant and captured a lot of support across the country especial in the township area. According to Raftopoulos, the party proved so popular that, within a relatively short time, it had

established no less than thirty nine branches around the country and boasted a membership of six thousand.¹ Gatsheni argues that, it stood for a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere and the social, economic and political equality advancement for all.² It also defied racism vehemently. Gatsheni says that, SRANC principles project that it was a moderate liberal oriented nationalist party that was mainly opposed to racism as the key aspect that blocked the formation of an integrated nation.³ Gann stipulates that, SRANC utilized civil disobedience to destabilise the government and capture some international attention.⁴

SRANC diplomatic relations with other liberation movements, institutions and countries.

SRANC's diplomatic relations was a water-shed of ZAPU diplomatic relations during the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. The significant foundation of SRANC diplomatic relations are ignored. Historical narratives on SRANC history are very shallow. Little has been said as it is general portrayed from a much localised perspective yet through its prodigious diplomatic engagements it managed to take the Zimbabwean case across the African continent and abroad. Mbengo states that, SRANC diplomatic history can be largely traced back from the existence of ANC of South Africa, the first political party to be formed in Southern African region.⁵ Ray avers that, in Southern Africa in general, South Africa was older than her other counterparts, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in terms of colonial occupation through the effective settlement by Jan Van Riebeeck in 1651 from Netherlands, which made S.A, lead in everything social, economic and political developments.⁶ As such, South Africa became the power house of the first Southern African political movements as all the aforementioned countries had liberation movement that were named after ANC a name that was borrowed from South Africa. This is evidence enough to

show that SRANC had connections with other liberation movement and its ideas were highly shaped by South African ANC ideologies.

Nkomo says that, he made many friends at Adams College and Witwatersrand University who later set on the same table to discuss and share ideas of liberating their countries. While he was in South Africa Nkomo met young brilliant students who later became prominent in the liberation of Zimbabwe people like Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Seretse Khama of Botswana.⁷ In this manner relations across individual representatives were established and later influenced cordial diplomatic relations between their liberation movements. SRANC was not limited to African affairs only. Nkomo posits that, in 1948, India, under Pandit Nehru, freed itself from the British imperial rule, SRANC attended the congress in honour to the Indian National Congress, the main instrument of that country's liberation.⁸ As SRANC's delegate, Nkomo met delegates from many countries and established diplomatic relations with some of the delegations who later contributed effectively in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. He established cordial relations with an American, Frank Ferrari, who later gave SRANC members all sort of support while in New York, seeking to draw the world's attention to the Rhodesian case at the United Nations.

In 1952, the British government organised a federation of the three separate territories in what it called Central Africa, however they needed an inclusion of a black representative from Southern Rhodesia. Nkomo was invited to join the Southern Rhodesia delegation to the London conference. Nkomo says that, he went there to oppose the idea of the federation like other African leaders in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who were deeply hostile to federation.⁹ At this point the spirit of oneness begun to exist amongst leaders from the three territories. They spoke one voice, they all stood brazen and vehemently rejected the creation of federation. Though their effort was ignored, the spirit of unity was cultivated as they vowed to diplomatically work together to dismantle the federation and colonialism at large.

Nkomo says that, present in the London conference were Northern Rhodesia delegates Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda whom he deemed a serious and determined individual in the cooperation of African nationalist movement as a force to destroy federation and colonial government at large.¹⁰ Hence one can note that SRANC had diplomatic relations with other liberation movements. According to Nkomo, after the London conference a meeting was held at Fort Jameson, where Nkomo and Calton Ngcebetsha attended, there they met Kamuzi Banda and his team, Harry Nkumbula, Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe from Northern Rhodesia.¹¹ This galvanised and reinforced these leaders' solidarity whose struggle was similar but also so different. Indications of a united African resistance were in sight. The seeds of strong possible future diplomatic relations was thus planted.

In 1957, on another meeting held in London which was boycotted by N. R and Nyasaland nationalist leaders but attended by Nkomo and Savanhu upon failure by whites to produce desirable results, Nkomo and Savanhu stated categorically that, on behalf of other colleagues and SRANC they reject the idea of federation and walked out of the meeting.¹² Through that they captured the attention of various sympathetic British people and got in touch with Nkomo and expressed their support. They established diplomatic relations with people like Feaner Brockway, Commander Fox-Pitt and Reverend Michael Scott who all gave financial support to SRANC to facilitate its political programs.¹³

According to Sibanda, Nkomo played a pivotal role in internationalizing the Southern Rhodesia political crisis through successive attendance at conferences, including the 1953 Constitutional Review Conference held in London.¹⁴ He further states that, it was during these political trips that Nkomo established diplomatic relations with various civic organizations, religious groups, civil rights movements, labour groups, and trade unions,¹⁵ all of which showed sympathy to the plight of the Africans. According to Clement, although SRANC was still a small political movement, Nkomo managed to broadcast the plight of the

Africans to the Western world through various conferences and events in Britain.¹⁶ The plight of the Africans was not much in the public eye.¹⁷ Nkomo's intricate diplomatic engagements enabled him to enlighten the Western world about the harsh colonial privations that Africans experienced in Rhodesia.

As the international political wave of change swept across the globe, things changed in a positive way for SRANC. Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country to get its independence from Britain in 1957. This resulted in a nationalist euphoria in most African countries, particularly those under British rule. Sibanda avers that, an independent Ghana offered Nkomo's SRANC financial and political support. Through those improved diplomatic relations, Nkomo attended Kwame Nkrumah's All-African People's Conference in Ghana, meeting with other nationalist leaders from nationalist organisations across Africa who later became African liberation movements.¹⁸ There Nkomo and others learned new techniques of agitation and subversion and adopted the doctrine of pan-Africanism, which he merged with his party's political agenda.¹⁹ Mbengo postulates that, Nkomo established diplomatic relations with people like Holden Roberto from Angola, Oscar Kambona and his delegation from Tanganyika, Tennyson Makhiwane from South Africa, Tom Mboya from Kenya and his old friend Kenneth Kaunda.²⁰ These had all attended in the higher interest of creating links with outside world and tap out diplomatic support in the fight against colonialism.

Furthermore, Sibanda avers that, at this congress, more than 300 delegates from 65 parties and organisations from overseas attended.²¹ Present in this august gathering were, the American Committee on Africa "ACOA" led by George Houser, 25 representatives of American non-governmental organisations. Apart from ACOA, present was African-American Institute, American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisation "AFLCIO", American Society of African Culture, Harlem-based United African Nationalist Movement, American Service Committee, Associated Negro Press. Soviet Union and China

had also sent representatives.²² Sibanda asserts that, Nkomo did not lose time in galvanising support for his nationalist party in its efforts to decolonise S.R, his participation made his party's cause very visible to these delegates. He was elected as a Federal member of the Conference Steering Committee due to his active participation on the deliberation of issues that were discussed.²³

According to Sibanda, at this conference Nkomo established diplomatic relations with George Houser of the ACOA, a man whose organisation supported his successive parties up to the day of Zimbabwe's independence. Apart from that, it was after the ACCRA conference that independent African and Asian states started to financially and materially support nationalist parties in S.R.²⁴ Worth mentioning is friendship that Nkomo established with John Kale from Uganda, who introduced Nkomo to the Egyptian delegation Dr Galal and his deputy Mohammed Mohammed Faiek who after a conference invited SRANC panel to meet the Egyptian leader, who was genuinely committed to the national liberation in Africa. In 1959, Nkomo states that, under the auspices of SRANC, he managed to meet Colonel Nasser the president of Egypt and established effective diplomatic relations. He was allowed to stay in Cairo after his party was announced banned. All the expenses of Nkomo stay there were covered by the Egyptian government and got offered a small office in the building of the African Association in Zamalek, under a department called the Smart district of Cairo.²⁵ This was the channel through which president Nasser gave support to liberation movements.

Furthermore, by 1959, SRANC, had become a known revolutionary movement. President Nassir of Egypt had begun offering financial support to the party as early as 1959 after making contact with Nkomo. Thus, Nkomo's role on the continental front made the SRANC stronger and more widely known. In the eyes of some of his lieutenants and some liberal white supporters of the struggle at the time, his international travels were criticized as a jet-setting performance that epitomized his personal flaws. However, Petros refute these claims

as malicious and baseless, he says that, in reality, these jaunts gained the party invaluable political diplomatic relations both regionally and internationally.²⁶ In this light, it is crystal clear that diplomatic relations were not a new phenomenon with the liberation movement which fought against the colonial government as they were initiated for as early as the rise of first mass nationalism in the colonies.

Before the banning of SRANC, the party had managed to establish intricate diplomatic relations various organisations across the globe. Gordon stipulates that, SRANC successfully managed to establish intricate diplomatic relations with Reverend Michael Scott sponsored by Jane Simmonds at the African Bureau.²⁷ Nkomo says that, SRANC established sound diplomatic relations with Commander Fox-Pitt of Anti-Slavery Society and the Fabian Society and many other individuals who were fully committed to the anti-colonial stance.²⁸ These organisations extensively supported the party's campaign and offered SRANC money for furthering its agenda of decolonization. Nyangoni asserts that, On 26 February 1959, SRANC was however banned by parliament under the newly passed Unlawful Organizations Act, thereby effectively putting a stop to the nationalist movement for a year.²⁹ Nkomo was in Cairo at the time of party's banning and was not among the 500 arrested. He was able to establish a base in London in the interim and was chosen as president of the new radical National Democratic Party in absentia.³⁰

National Democratic Party's Formation.

In 1960, NDP, was formed to succeed SRANC, According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, SRANC, was succeeded by the NDP, which was formed on 1 January 1960 and got institutionalised in Salisbury.³¹ He says that, SRANC was banned despite its moderate agenda which was meant to fight for eradication of racism as the key aspect that blocked the formation of an integrated nation.³² He further elaborates that, the ability of SRANC in inducing effective mass demonstrations and internationalization of the harsh colonial privations prompted the settler

government to destroy the party.³³ Nyangoni stipulates that, the ban of the SRANC in 1959 was meant to derail the nationalists' agenda of political freedom and equality in Southern Rhodesia, the arrest of leaders such as James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, was part of the colonial government's strategy of thwarting any blossoming revolutionary plans which sort to spearhead counter resistance.³⁴ He argues that despite the rude gesture of the settler government, nationalist leaders were not demotivated rather they upped their standard of agitation for political, economic and social freedom.³⁵ SRANC, became succeeded by NDP whose scope was much radical than one of its predecessor.

Gatsheni says that, NDP, pursued the struggle for, and attainment of freedom for African people of Southern Rhodesia.³⁶ He further argues that, NDP's principle of one man one vote brought forward as a solution to what became known as the "Rhodesian Problem."³⁷ Gatsheni avers that, NDP made deep in-road works into rural areas and its rallies were massive.³⁸ Therefore one can note that NDP managed to intensively politicise also rural people.

NDP diplomatic relations.

Like its predecessor, NDP, was actively involved in diplomatic relations. Its existence and policy ensured perpetuity of its predecessor's diplomatic craft. This is cemented by Gatsheni, who asserts that, NDP, was committed to working in conjunction with other freedom organizations in Africa for the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Africa and the achievements of pan Africanism.³⁹ NDP's diplomatic relations were also instrumental for its survival when the party was badly threatened by ideological differences which shortly caused splits.

Matters that were left unresolved during the era of SRANC diplomatic relations were carried over by NDP. Nkomo says that, in 1960, national delegation of the NDP for SR, joined heads with UNIP members from N.R and attended a conference in London to challenge the idea of federation. Present in this august conference were Robert Mugabe, NDP secretary, M Sipalo

UNIP general secretary, NDP president Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda UNIP president. At this conference the federation's strong holds were cracked as nationalist leaders harshly rejected the existence of a federation as a direct means of entrenching British colonialism a violation against human rights.⁴⁰ This also instilled strong diplomatic bonds between nationalist leaders who realized the power of unit in bringing down the colonial government. It is the presence of these diplomatic relations that made it possible for NDP, to push for the decolonisation agenda through to the United Nations. Strong supporters of NDP's case stood unconditionally on behalf of NDP and made the Rhodesian case known at United Nations. Petros avers that, delegates from Ghana, India, Tanzania, Nigeria, Tunisia and Egypt were greatly helpful in pushing the Zimbabwean case on each and every single moment they got.⁴¹ According to Nkomo, it was IK Jha, the Indian, chairman of the decolonisation committee who played a pivotal role on many occasions. He pushed NDP's fight to put the question of the independence of S.R on the agenda of its fourth committee.⁴² This was possible due to the long diplomatic relations that had been established between SRANC and NDP respectively. As such NDP, had backers who advocated for her case at International level.

In addition, Sibanda avers that, in 1961, NDP, managed to put the Rhodesia grievance to the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four on Decolonisation which rejected Britain misguided argument that Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony since 1923 and that the international affairs were not a matter for discussion by the world body.⁴³ Britain's unscrupulous and mendacious means of refuting the responsibility to grant independence to Africans was diplomatically challenged and the Rhodesian case became recognised by the UN decolonisation committee.

Ray says that, the internationalization of the Rhodesian Problem was an expensive adventure with which nationalist on their capability could have not managed to do, they needed financial assistance to travel to all places they could to attract assistance, hotel expenses

needed to be catered for as well as raising money for their political administration.⁴⁴ Ray further alludes that, on behalf NDP, Nkomo, travelled to far places like Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Ethiopia and abroad his trips were sponsored by these governments, however bit by bit Nkomo established diplomatic relations with leaders of the independent nations in Africa.⁴⁵ At this point NDP managed to win at least the support of diplomats and decision makers in some areas which Nkomo and other delegates approached. Nkomo concurs with this, he says, Tubman of Liberia gave him during his first visit to Liberia, \$5000 cash, which partly covered his traveling expenses and the remaining covered the party expenses back home.⁴⁶

Meanwhile Ushewokunze says that, at the height of NDP conflict, diplomatic relations played a pivotal role in reuniting the nationalist leaders back under NDP which had formed ZNP under Michael Mawema.⁴⁷ Ranger stipulates that, due to diplomatic relations that NDP had established with Nkrumah of Ghana, Nkrumah called the NDP and ZNP leaders to Accra, when he found that the main charge was that Nkomo had accepted an agreement which other members repudiated and conflict erupted.⁴⁸ Sibanda states that, Nkrumah rebuked NDP leaders not to be scattered by small political problems which take place in the administering of the party, he explained to them that, leaders often make decisions, however if other members do not accept it. Unit is achieved when a leader follows the will of his party and does not stand against it, as such he cannot be regarded as untrustworthy.⁴⁹ He aged members not to solve conflicts by secession. This helped to curb the nationalist divisive forces whose mind set were now driven by emotions and run wild with minds of disappointment and frustration that was brought about the acceptance of a new constitution. His deliberations enabled to reunite the nationalist forces and prevented unnecessary divisions. Nationalists' focus was rejuvenated, in this manner the party became prepared to continue with the

struggle outside the memories of the constitution. This helped the party to work in solidarity with other pan African friends that the party had established.

According to Nkomo, while he was in Dar es Salaam NDP was banned however, the law under which it was proscribed said nothing about any other party.⁵⁰ NDP members instantly decided to carry on exactly as before, under a new party but with the same membership and constitution. According to Coltart, the description given to the new party was Zimbabwe African People's Union. As ZAPU, the party agreed, proscribed or not banned, the party was not going to give in to white men tendencies of outlawing their political parties. The name Zimbabwe, signified the primordial stone court and palace built by the rulers of the nation before any non-African intruder appeared in the land.⁵¹ ZAPU, was viewed by whites as more poignant and radical liberation party.

ZAPU Formation.

Nyangoni states that, ZAPU was formed on 17 December, the new party was committed sincerely in embracing the principles of democracy.⁵² However in response to white's ignorance to Black Nationalism saw the beginning of 1962 being marred with physical confrontation of Southern Rhodesia. During the era of NDP, in 1961, Nkomo had told the British minister in London precisely why blacks would be forced into the armed struggle. The approval by the Salisbury government the referendum of white minority constitution for Southern Rhodesia which entrenched white power which blacks rejected. Sibanda says that, in 1962, Nkomo went to London to present the rejection of the constitution that was imposed to Africans in 1961. In consultation with minister of the Commonwealth Relations office, duke of Devonshire. Nkomo presented the Rhodesian case, but the minister responded adamantly. Mr Nkomo you must understand that Southern Rhodesia has a complex progressive economy. It is certainly impossible to hand it over to be run by amateur hands.⁵³

According to Sibanda, Nkomo responded vehemently and ruthlessly against the assertion of justifying colonialism based on development which he categorically said it was supposed to be dismantled than to maintain infrastructures that promoted subjugation and oppression of blacks.⁵⁴

ZAPU's central committee fully approved and seconded this notion and unanimously agreed, that fighting was inevitable, and that they needed all the outside help they could get.

Diplomatic factors making ZAPU to be regarded as an authentic liberation movement.

Mazarire avers that, Nkomo had pragmatic diplomatic abilities of backing publicly his sponsors, Nkomo supported Gamal Abdel Nasser's condemnation of Israel in most speeches at early pan-African congresses.⁵⁵ His tactical support made ZAPU to be given a first priority as Egypt was also highly active in influencing the party that was to be regarded as an authentic liberation movement. Shamuyarira posits that, Nkomo was way too ahead of ZANU in earning Nasser's diplomatic support, which was important, given Egypt's leading role as an anti-colonialist and supporter of both pan-Arab and African nationalism.⁵⁶ Moreover, Egypt was given the obligation to lead the Casablanca group military command for African independence at its June 1962 conference.⁵⁷ Hence ZAPU's sophisticated diplomatic relations with Casablanca group made it again easy to gain the status of being regarded as an authentic liberation movement.

Furthermore Mazarire states that, ZAPU gained the status of being an authentic liberation movement due to Sino-Soviet tensions which were fought in and out at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation "AAPSO", founded in 1957 to further the ideals of national liberation and third world solidarity.⁵⁸ AAPSO was highly blinkered by Soviet's verdicts her sponsor which Nkomo had stable diplomatic relations with. According to Mazarire, the OAU mobilised funding via AAPSO, and Soviet supremacy meant that the OAU Liberation Committee initially mimicked the Soviet position.⁵⁹

Mazarire argues that, through the influence of the Soviet, a resolution was passed that the participating liberation movements such as ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde “PAIGC” be considered the sole authentic representatives of their people, which was ratified by the OAU Liberation Committee.⁶⁰ Mbita cements this, he says that, in fact this was enormously motivated by some diplomatic relations with the NDP leader, Nkomo had established earlier, when he met the Committee’s representatives at the AAPSO meeting in April 1960 and in July went to Moscow as president of ZAPU, formed after the proscription of the NDP.⁶¹

Conclusion.

In summation, a close analysis of SRANC and NDP history, shows that their diplomatic relations were formed and evolved during the interactions of representatives from various liberation movements and interaction of people with the lives of exiled communities in cities and towns. Again these external relations shaped the views and aspirations of these liberation movements. These diplomatic relations were assumed by both African states and liberation movements which was fundamental in upholding the flow of ideas, material aid, psychological support and so forth. This is brought into light by oratorical questions like, who mediated, with what means and what ends, these questions reveal a host of revelation on the diplomatic relations of SRANC and NDP. Therefore it goes without saying, SRANC and NDP diplomatic relations were a foundation of ZAPU diplomatic relations and made it easy for ZAPU to be recognised as an authentic liberation movement, as ZAPU was a direct descendant of these first two political parties and thereby inherited its intricate phenomenal diplomatic achievements.

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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ZAPU'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FROM 1961-69.

Introduction.

By way of introduction, it was highlighted in the previous chapter that diplomatic relations were not a new phenomenon in the liberation movement of Southern African countries. It was the nature of liberation movements across the African continent to enter into diplomatic relations. This was achieved by attending conferences on which a plethora of issues of their concerns were discussed and resolutions passed out. This in turn enabled these nationalist leaders to establish diplomatic relations with all sorts of individuals, groups, organisations and countries who understood their plight. The previous chapter revealed that the first Zimbabwean nationalist parties to be formed were also part of that system. It also brought into picture the foundation of ZAPU's wide sophisticated diplomatic relations. As highlighted in the previous chapter, ZAPU's diplomatic relations was highly a continuation of what was already laid down by SRANC and NDP, as it was a direct offshoot of these parties. This is cemented by Sibanda, he says that, ZAPU, was actually an ideologically metamorphosed entity of the first, the SRANC and second NDP.¹ Thereby emerged extremely radical and highly visionary. This chapter will discuss further the development of ZAPU's diplomatic engagements. It will show what kind of assistance ZAPU and its military wing obtained through its diplomatic manoeuvres. Most important this chapter shows the nature or means through which ZAPU basically got its assistance. ZAPU-ZPRA relations with ANC- MK will also be analysed briefly. ZAPU's sour diplomatic relations will be also analysed.

ZAPU's external contacts.

Most of available scholarly work has tended to trace the existence and effectiveness of diplomatic relations of liberation movements from 1963, when OAU was established and a Liberation Committee was established which had its main duties of coordinating and

facilitating the flow of weapons and funds to various liberation movements in Central-Southern Africa. This has effectively led to omission of important historical records. Before OAU was established weapons had started reaching various nationalist groups through smuggling. At the formation of OAU, it became easy to facilitate the flow of both humanitarian and military equipment from various sources. Besides OAU's organised assistance for these liberation movements. In February 1962, ZAPU's international campaign took two important steps forward. Nkomo, argues that, in Addis Ababa at the beginning of the month, Kenneth Kaunda chaired the pan -African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa. All the independent African nations and guests from almost all liberation movements, agreed to back ZAPU's struggle and to start a freedom fund.² This brought ZAPU political support and some financial help from various countries and organisations outside Africa.

A flood of ZAPU's weaponry assistance opened after June 1962, Nkomo stipulates that, a summit conference of the Casablanca group of African nations was held in the first week of June, where Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Algerian Provisional Government agreed to set up a military command for African liberation under Egyptian leadership. The ZAPU Central Committee authorised Nkomo and two other colleagues to go and get arms anywhere they could. On 12 September 1962, Nkomo and his colleagues went to Cairo where they received 24 semi-automatic assault rifles and big bag of grenades. They packed them in long boxes together with Mohammed Faick, whom he had first met in Ghana in 1957.³ According to Nkomo, before ferrying the weapons home, they were taught how to use the guns so that when they came back they could instruct their military men well.⁴

Furthermore, Nkomo says that, in the same year they made another trip to Cairo to pick up more ammunitions and grenades which landed in Tanganyika, then made its way to Zambia where Kenneth Kaunda was a dominating figure and had established diplomatic relations

with.⁵ Nkomo states that, ZAPU, received valuable cooperation in the smuggling operations from ministers in the Northern Rhodesia government, with Kaunda's knowledge and approval.⁶ As highlighted in the previous chapter that, Nkomo had established strong diplomatic relations with Egypt. One can note that, by early-mid 1962 and onwards ZAPU's was already receiving weapons from Egypt to equip its youth wing that was going to carry acts of sabotages. Furthermore, Nkomo says that, he had established diplomatic relations with George Lusinde, minister of Home Affairs in Tanganyika, who made arrangements for getting past the customs there.⁷ This helped in the transportation of weapons to Zambia where there were later to be taken to Southern Rhodesia by Joseph Msika.

ZAPU's external contacts with the Socialist countries.

Mbita stipulates that, ZAPU diplomatic relations with the USSR began during some contacts with the NDP leader, Nkomo had established earlier, when he met the Committee's representatives at the AAPSO meeting in April 1960 and in July visited Moscow as premier of ZAPU, formed after the interdiction of the NDP.⁸ In addition to this, Mbita says that, in 1961 a protuberant leader of the National Democratic Party Tarcissious George Silundika was sent from Cairo to Moscow as a guest of the Solidarity Committee. There he awe-struck the Soviets as a reserved and strong-minded man, committed to his cause and his request for assistance, was well received. NDP was viewed as the most progressive and mass party and the NDP was allocated \$8400 in 1961.⁹ Mbita further posits that, the obtainable archival documents do not indicate provisions to ZAPU in 1962, however they were provided later on a regular basis. For example, ZAPU received \$19.600 in 1963, \$20.000 in 1965 and \$28.000 in 1966, via the assistance that was provided by the Solidarity Committee.¹⁰

Dabengwa is explicitly clear about the kind of military training which ZAPU received during the 1960s. He says that, the training that ZAPU received was generally meant to complement and intensify the sabotage activities of the youth wing of ZAPU.¹¹ One will recall that, at

first, the weapons of the activists consisted of simple petrol bombs and other explosives made out of stolen materials from some neighbouring mines. The range and sophistication of weapons improved when the first groups trained under ZAPU returned from Ghana and China in 1962 and 1963 where they brought to the youth new knowledge of the use of hand grenades and pistols, mostly smuggled from Zaire where a war was going on, and the manufacturing of home-made bombs.¹² However, a major change in the conception of the struggle both within ZAPU and ZANU, came about in 1964, when it became obvious that settler government intended to interdict the nationalist parties as well as detain its leaders.

Ngwabi avers that, in February 1964, ZAPU sent out part of its National Executive, consisting of Chikerema, George Bodzo Nyandoro, the National Secretary, Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, the National Treasurer, George Silundika, the National Secretary of Publicity, and Edward Ndlovu, the Deputy National Secretary to Zambia to organise the struggle from there.¹³ According to Nwabi, it was this management which recruited a plethora of youths for military training to overseas who were absconding to Zambia from possible arrests for their sabotage activities. He says that, amongst the first recruits to be sent to the Soviet Union for training in early 1964, were Dabengwa, Akim Ndlovu, Ethan Dube, Edward Bhebe, Gideon Ngoshi, Joseph Nyandoro, Ambrose Muntinhiri, Jabulani Ncube and Robson Manyika.¹⁴

Mbita avers that, more ZAPU members went for political training in the Institute of Social Sciences. The diplomatic political support that the USSR gave to ZAPU included media transmissions in Shona and Ndebele beamed to Zimbabwe. Meanwhile in 1964 James Chikerema, requested the Soviets to train 30 persons for four months, in subversive work for military sabotage and in manufacturing of simple small arms. Other two groups of ZAPU recruits were sent for training in Moscow in the summer of 1964.¹⁵ There they studied guerrilla and conventional warfare as well as field medicine.¹⁶ Bhebe stipulates that, in 1965, another section of 36 recruits was split into smaller segments which were despatched to

different socialist countries for high-quality training, he says ten members of this group were sent to the Soviet Union to train first in political ideology and later in guerrilla warfare.¹⁷

In addition, Ngwabi stipulates that, some were sent to Bulgaria, and a small figure to China and North Korea, such that when they eventually returned early in 1965 and assembled together with those who had trained even earlier they were above 60.¹⁸ Mbengo avers that, before the return of the first groups ZAPU managed to send more recruits for training to other places, he further alludes that, in late 1964, under the legation of Charles Chikerema to establish diplomatic relations with Algeria, Algeria offered ZAPU training facilities such that it was able to send recruits of more than 150 recruits for the first time,¹⁹ while Bhebe buttresses this with an estimate of 120 and further mentions Nikita Mangena as part of recruits who were trained in Algeria and became one of the most illustrious ZAPU's military commanders.²⁰ According to Ray, ZAPU's diplomatic relations with the Soviet were coxswained through the Soviet ambassador Mr Solodonokov in Zambia meanwhile in Russia, Kennel Dube from ZAPU maintained the diplomatic relations and facilitated the obtainment of all necessary weaponry.²¹ Moreover, Ray avers that, these consuls were entirely committed to the work of decolonisation and liberation of Rhodesia from the diabolic magnification of colonialism,²² all requests that were made through them, they made sure that the outline requested went on time to the right committees in Moscow ZAPU would then receive the kind of assistance they needed.

According to Dabengwa, all those countries around the Baltic Sea gave ZAPU extensive military support, scholarships and some hardware material aid.²³ He further alludes that, under Eastern Europe countries that gave ZAPU assistance were, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Germany Democratic Republic, Poland and Hungary.²⁴ These countries gave the most invaluable assistance for ZAPU's military training and gave the party, some hardware materials that was required to prosecute the armed struggle. ZAPU received varied range of

assistance ranging from weaponry, armaments, clothing, and scholarship for academic studies and food so as to keep the war going on.

Nkomo posits that, first contact with the Soviet Union provided ZAPU's representatives military training. They did not train ZPRA combat soldiers directly, but trained ZAPU's Special Affairs leaders to do the training of their cadres.²⁵ Therefore the vast majority of ZAPU's instructors in other African countries were trained by other Africans particularly in Algeria, which was exceptionally supportive. Ray posits that, Zvangabi Dube played a significant role in reinforcing ZAPU's diplomatic relations with Cuba under Fidel Castro, a leader who was whole dedicated in fighting imperialism, he believed for his own country and for Africa, they firstly offered weapons and later got engaged on training ZPRA cadres in Angola.²⁶ Through these intricate diplomatic relations ZAPU received highly sophisticated training from Cubans. Nkomo, cements this, he says, those who trained in Cuba were trained by Cubans.²⁷ Dabengwa says that, the first phrase of training received from Socialist countries including Cuba consisted of political lessons, military training, and training in intelligence and counterintelligence tactics.²⁸

Ben adds on and say, in South America Cuba was the biggest supplier of material assistance which included weapons and uniforms up to the end of the liberation struggle. He says Cuba gave military advisors to ZPRA and trained some of the ZPRA cadres in last phase of war. While the rest of the West Indies like Jamaica and the Bahamas Islands gave humanitarian assistance and offered scholarships to ZAPU members meanwhile the USA and Canada offered mostly scholarships.²⁹

ZAPU's external contacts with African countries and other liberation movements.

ZAPU benefited a lot from the establishment of a Liberation Committee a branch that was established by OAU, ZAPU managed to have external contacts with Tanzania under the auspices of OAU, which made Tanzania the first country to offer ZAPU a military training

base and eventually opened headquarter office there. However, ZAPU outside OAU initiatives entered into diplomatic engagements with various countries so as to fully equip itself and better launch its attacks. Bhebe stipulates that, by January 1967, all of ZAPU cadres returned in Tanzania where OAU Liberation Committee had negotiated with the Tanzanian government for military bases for liberation movements, and ZAPU was stationed at one of these in Morogoro. However some who were strategically selected for further sophisticated training were sent again overseas and other African countries, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Algeria and later Angola³⁰

ZAPU leaders negotiated for military bases with the Zambian government whose diplomatic relations were established long back during the SRANC and NDP era. According to Bhebe, ZAPU was offered military training bases by Zambia which they used as their launch pad, which enabled ZAPU to deploy and cover Zambia along the whole Zambian/Zimbabwe frontiers from Feira to Kazungula.³¹ Bhebe says that, ZPRA had effective and active troops, from Feira, Mushika opposite Kazangagarare, Chirundu, some in Nyamomba fighting in Kariba area, Sinazongwe, Chipepo, Kabanga and while the last one was stationed in Livingstone that functioned on a commando basis.³²

ZAPU's mature diplomatic relations with Zambia enabled her to launch the armed struggle ahead of ZANU. Rueben states that, he found out that in the nine months they were away from Zambia, there had been a number of confrontations which were done by ZAPU using grenades explosives and semi-automatic rifles obtained from Egypt and North Korea which they had diplomatic military support.³³ ZANU followed suit in April 1966, were two commando clusters crossed the Zambezi, carrying semi-automatic rifles obtained from China all their men like ZAPU's cadres achieved nothing.³⁴

Mbengo says that, through the excellent ambassadorial capability of Jack Ngwenya with close assistance of Dumiso Dabengwa as ZAPU's consuls they organised invaluable

assistance for the party that made Zambia to become the main closest support base by the late 1960s. He further says that, ZAPU received military training bases, land for agriculture to feed the guerrillas, and offered Zimbabwean refugees and cadres medicines, clothing, food, and so forth.³⁵ Agnes intimates that, Zambia played a pivotal role in assisting ZPRA cadres especial those who got wounded in the war, exiled Zimbabwean communities were extensively engaged by Zambian authorities in the policy of blood donation which benefited most ZPRA wounded cadres at clinics and hospitals. She further states that, exiled workers had special duty roles which were structured by the government were sizeable numbers of workers formed groups that prepared meals for ZAPU members who were hospitalised.³⁶ Apart from that, Ray avers that, between 1964 and 1968 ZAPU had large contingents being sent from Zambia to Algeria, for guerrilla training and intelligence, there they were trained by Algerian instructors and some instructors within the party who had acquired Soviet military training. This was simple attainable as ZAPU recruited more cadres from Zimbabwean exiled communities in Zambia.³⁷

MK-ZPRA /Special Affairs diplomatic relations.

According to Bhebe and Ranger, in 1967, ZAPU entered a joint operation the ANC of South Africa. ANC had trained a large amount of Umkhonto We Sizwe cadres, however they were facing infiltration challenges to their battle front their efforts to infiltrate South Africa through Botswana were constantly intercepted and risked confiscation of their weapons by the Botswana Security Forces.³⁸ Dabengwa, puts it clear why ZAPU easily formed a diplomatic military alliance with MK, he says that, before relations were established ANC and ZAPU had known each other, before alliance terms they could share information on a number of things and at some point ZAPU had assisted some of ANC to cross through Zimbabwe to Zambia.³⁹ In addition, Khutshwekhaya says that, this alliance was also

influenced by presence of units of South African Army operating together with the Rhodesian Army along Rhodesian border with Zambia.⁴⁰

Archival correspondents states that, as counter strategy to Rhodesian and South African joint military operations and considering the dangers and risks that was going to happen if MK cadres crossed through Zimbabwe on their own. ZAPU entered into diplomatic alliance which was to operate on the basis of MK cadres helping ZPRA forces fight Rhodesian forces so as to clear their path to Beitbridge and cross to face Apartheid terrorist in SA.⁴¹ The fact that Rhodesia was not free meant that they could fight their way to South Africa therefore diplomatic alliance with ZAPU made perfect logic in enabling their track to their enemy front.

Mbengo states that, ZAPU had also established intricate diplomatic relations with Botswana and there Ethan Dube made all the necessary efforts to get Botswana support.⁴² Mazarire avers that, Botswana played a significant role as a pipeline as it created recruitment granaries for ZAPU, which were en route to Zambia.⁴³ Due to diplomatic relations between ZAPU and Botswana, the refugee camps in Botswana became the recruitment grounds, for ZAPU. He further states that, between 1974 and 1975, Botswana's diplomatic relations with ZAPU improved as they softened towards Zimbabwean liberation movements after this period.⁴⁴ ZAPU became the main beneficiary of Botswana's change of attitude, as it used Botswana in its intensive recruitments.

Meanwhile, Clement says that, due to relaxation of laws by Botswana ZAPU managed to illegal send its troops via Botswana so as to infiltrate more cadres in Rhodesia.⁴⁵ He says that, most importantly Botswana offered Zimbabweans who supported ZAPU with refugee camps who could not be instantly ferried to Zambia for military training. In these camps Botswana offered these refugees food, clothing, shelter and medical facilities.⁴⁶ Botswana became the reception and transit zone and a haven for refugees who were awaiting transportation.

Apart from that, ZAPU had intricate diplomatic relations with some NGOs, which gave ZAPU a lot of humanitarian assistance, Nkomo postulates that, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of West Germany was extremely helpful.⁴⁷ Nkomo says that, ZAPU received heavy western contributions through the United Nations multilateral programmes which enabled tens of thousands of refugees from the Smith oppressive regime's to survive in the neighbouring countries.⁴⁸ According to Nkomo, the commissioner, Poul Hartling, took a close personal interest in the Zimbabwean problem. Stephen Nkomo, worked closely with him to create the Victory Camp School, outside Lusaka, which gave education to 8,000 girls, a was tremendous enterprise, of great value.⁴⁹ Nkomo states that, the educational activities for young people depended largely on NGOs and Western countries generosity.⁵⁰

ZAPU's sour diplomatic relations.

Though Nkomo, had established cordial relations with Tanzanian nationalist leaders at first, soon their relations went sour. Nkomo avers that, the division within ZAPU lay in Dar es Salaam, which because of its geographical location had to be the main base of ZAPU's external organisation.⁵¹ The PAFMECSA, instituted its support for the organisation in Dar in 1962, and the OAU's liberation committee followed when it was set up in 1963. The city became the main headquarters for liberation movements for central and southern Africa.⁵² However, Nkomo believed that, being in Dar es Salaam meant being under the wing of President Julius Nyerere and that caused problems. Nkomo says that, Nyerere seemed to take the view that ZAPU, supported the armed struggle because there were bloodthirsty.⁵³ As independence for Tanganyika was won without fighting, hence he pushed for ZAPU to negotiate with S.R government if they wanted his support.⁵⁴ Differences in perceptions between the two created enmity throughout the liberation war.

Thompson states that, Nyerere always sort to dominate the strategies and personalities of the liberation movements to which he gave hospitality.⁵⁵ As such Nyerere failed to understand

that, Nkomo's contact with other outside countries was older than his. Nyerere attempts to influence Nkomo, and his refusal to be controlled made their relations go sour. Nkomo says that, Nyerere frequently criticised him and backed his critics.⁵⁶ Nkomo says that, in 1963, 10 August ZANU was formed by his critics who were fully backed by Julius Nyerere. This led to intensification of sour diplomatic relations between ZAPU and Julius Nyerere. More tensions took place while in Tanzania, Nkomo says that, in the early 1960s repression grew in Tanganyika and one by one ZAPU's members were charged and tried with various offences, such that ZAPU's members slipped quietly across the borders.⁵⁷ Thompson says that, once again sour diplomatic relations between ZAPU and Tanzania appeared after the formation of an embryo political leadership for the entire Zimbabwean nationalist movement, under the name of the ZIPA. ZPRA trainees were sent to the training camps in Tanzania, terrible consequences followed under Nyerere's influence, however disciplined ZPRA cadres strongly objected to political influence, which were violently hostile to Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders.⁵⁸ The refusal of ZAPU cadres led to them rounded up and detained and some tortured.

Nkomo posits that, At Morogoro over a hundred young ZAPU fighters died at the hands of ZANLA soldiers with the help of Tanzanian forces.⁵⁹ Nkomo says Nyerere's only sign of regret was allowing ZAPU leaders to visit the sites of massacres and re-bury of bodies, which had been thrown into a mass grave, some of the bodies were terrible mangled.⁶⁰ Thereafter ZAPU cadres' refused to be sent to Tanzania for training. According to Bhebe, ZAPU's sour relations with Nyerere led to ZAPU's closure of its training camp at Morogoro in Tanzania by the end of 1976, leaving Kaunda with a huge burden. Kaunda opened new military training centres at Koimba and Mukushi camp for male and female respectively.⁶¹

Conclusion.

ZAPU diplomatic relations in 1960s were heavily marred with subversive training to complement the nature of resistance which was at home. ZAPU received training on intelligence and guerrilla tactics. This training was largely meant to increase sabotages and force the Smith government into a negotiation table. Moreover at this point ZAPU only acquired light weapons which were in commensurate with repression that was pressed against nationalist forces. ZAPU was highly involved in the system of sending its recruited cadres outside Africa to gain expertise and do the training themselves in African countries which offered ZAPU the training bases. Wide knowledge was obtained on how to conduct effective sabotages, making petrol bombs and laying of landmines so as to detonate enemy trucks. ZAPU also obtained humanitarian assistance from NGOs and western countries through various contacts that its victorious leaders had managed to plant through diplomatic engagements. Apart from ZAPU's skilful ability to craft intricate diplomatic relations, ZAPU gained an international status of being regarded as an authentic liberation movement and indeed one. ZAPU also faced diplomatic antagonisms as early as its formation, the most significant sour diplomatic relation was between Dar es Salaam and ZAPU which erupted early in the 1960s and continued up to the end of the liberation struggle.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE: THE POST 1969-1971 TRANSFORMATION OF ZAPU'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

This chapter analyses ZAPU's diplomatic relations after the 1969-71 ZAPU's internal conflict which virtual led to a pause in the war efforts. ZAPU's diplomatic relations went to a standstill due to paralysation in the battle front. However, after their conflict resolution ZAPU transformed its diplomatic relations. ZAPU's new military apparatus became more militant and highly committed to war and made intensive changes. The scope of their diplomatic relations deepened, ZAPU now requested highly sophisticated weapons. This was also partly influenced by successive failed negotiations between nationalist leaders and Smith regime which compelled nationalist leaders to intensify the war. The chapter will be concluded by analysing the impact of engagement in diplomatic relations.

The impact of 1969-71 split on ZAPU's war activities and diplomatic relations.

According to Bhebe, ZAPU through its effective diplomatic relations by 1968, it had reached a peak point where it could have managed to perpetual fight effectively as it was able to produce a steady supply of trained personnel to reinforce and replenish its fighting forces. However, this respectable genesis was in 1969 completely disrupted by the political crisis occasioned by disagreements between Chikerema and J. Z. Moyo.¹ The 1969-71 conflict paused a threat to the survival of a party that had all along carried the status of being regarded as an authentic liberation movement. At that point ZAPU's war activities literally stopped, so did its diplomatic benefits. Its diplomatic craft was threatened. The party almost lost its external supporters. Fortunately by end of 1971 the party survived the sting of death and resumed its liberation activities. The party needed to rejuvenate the party's diplomatic credentials which it had lost during the period of stagnation in war activities. It has to be mentioned here, that the split led to re-arrangement of Special Affairs ZAPU's military wing and gave way to a new name ZPRA.

According to Shubin, by 1971 the split in ZAPU was over, however the detriment it caused to the movement cannot be underestimated. It caused the cessation of its armed struggle for three years and a mutiny in its camps in Zambia, which was crushed by Zambian forces.² ZAPU's military wing, ZPRA dwindled, a number of its fighters, including ZAPU Chief of Staff Robson Manyika and Solomon Mujuru, both Soviet-trained, crossed over to ZANU.³ ZAPU briefly lost its leading role in the liberation struggle and gave way to ZANU. This is cemented by Ray, he says that, even though FRELIMO had a similar status with ZAPU, as an authentic liberation movements, when FRELIMO started its operations, it co-operated with ZANU a party that was not regarded as an authentic movement because ZAPU was not there.⁴ As such ZAPU missed potential diplomatic relations with FRELIMO which she had all the advantage of having diplomatic relations with over ZANU. Archival corresponds state that, it is a historical fact that in 1969 James Chikerema and George Nyandoro suffered the temptation to seize the party, weaken the leadership of comrade president Nkomo and use the army to impose not only their supremacy but also that their clan which they mistakenly believed they represented.⁵ This adventure was finally crushed on August 21, 1971, in the bushes of Zambia. They branched off to form the abortive FROLIZI which again ZAPU lost more members to it.⁶ However, ZAPU through its intricate diplomatic relations, purified and invigorated its war activities.

According to Yurchak, the departure of Chikerema and Nyandoro opened way for ZAPU to resume again its all-round co-operation with external contacts. At the new meeting with Silundika in January 1972, during the AAPSO conference, he deplored the cessation of Soviet support for almost two years but was happy at its resumption.⁷

ZAPU's diplomatic relations with Nordic /Scandinavian states after 1970 ZAPU's conflict.

According to Sellostrom, Sweden assisted in the liberation struggle through the “Refugee Million” that the Swedish funds were directed to liberation movements in southern Africa. It also supported and introduced the educational assistance for refugee students as a way of emancipating them.⁸ Sellostrom avers that, the victorious leadership around J Z Moyo were aware about the diplomatic situation and that ZAPU during the conflict had lost opportunities of receiving official Swedish assistance. As soon as the conflict was resolved Edward Ndlovu, addressed a letter to the Swedish ambassador in Lusaka expressing the wish to re-establish the diplomatic relationship.⁹

Mbengo says that, after establishing normal intricate diplomatic relations with Sweden and the rest of Nordic states he was sent there as ZAPU's consul to conduct political canvassing, which saw ZAPU receiving a plethora of humanitarian aid from Sweden and other Nordic countries.¹⁰ According to Sellostrom, ZAPU soon established steady contacts with Sweden, in the beginning of 1973 which impacted positively on a more continuous aid relationship and from there on ZAPU instantly received 50.000 src as a point of departure for new aid.¹¹

Sellostrom asserts that, In October 1978, the Rhodesian regime embarked on massive military offenses on ZAPU's bases in Zambia, the Swedish government assisted ZAPU in relation to their requests for extra ordinary assistance.¹² ZAPU requested for assistance in the form of mobile field hospitals to ease Zambia's burdens. Sweden hesitated not in assisting ZAPU with their requested humanitarian assistance. ZAPU was heavily capacitated and went in a position of partial self-sustainability. ZAPU could now give medical treatment to hundreds and thousands of wounded Zimbabweans who were affected by the Rhodesian offenses at refugee camps. According to Sellostrom, on 8 November, President Kaunda made discussions with ambassador Heyman and permitted the emergency of proposed assistance in

reaction to increased atrocities committed by the adversary militaries. In outlook of the problematic safety, however, it was agreed that no profile-raising was supposed to be done. Sellostrom further alludes that, two more C130 Hercules carriers from the Swedish air force took off to Zambia on 29 November and on 8 December, respectively. They ferried full mobile hospitals comprised of eighteen tents with an aptitude to care for a hundred in-patients and two hundred out-patients.¹³

Apart from that, this was accompanied by a power plant, refrigerators, two cross-country ambulances carrying medicines and food to treat both ZPRA combatants and refugees in these camps.¹⁴ Apparent in these camps outbreak of diseases were frequent due to overcrowding and poor sanitation as such many people died either from malnutrition or outbreak of health related diseases and the Zambian government was now failing to fully carter for these burdens adequately as populations at this point had risen rapidly to a unprecedented magnitude. Furthermore Mbengo says that, as former consul in the Scandinavian countries he amassed extensive humanitarian assistance from the Nordic states which greatly assisted in covering ZAPU's war expenses.¹⁵ Sellostrom says that, another unique event on humanitarian co-operations of Sweden with ZAPU as liberation movement in Zambia, involved the transport and placement of several mobile hospitals 40 kilometres outside Lusaka as the war intensified. He says that, Nauder was sent to assist ZAPU protect their medical facilities by all means and to make sure that medical supplies were unbroken and save lives.¹⁶

This is cemented by Mbengo he says that, if it wasn't the intricate diplomatic backing of Scandinavian countries the masses would have languished in poverty and starvation while the guerrilla forces were going to be incapacitated to fight effective in the bushes without proper food or with empty stomachs.¹⁷ According to Bhebe, ZAPU's diplomatic relations with SIDA enabled her to receive 2.5 million in 1976, which ZAPU devoted the fund in the procurement

of food, clothes, vehicles and medicine.¹⁸ The purchased vehicles were used in transporting thirty thousand refugees in Zambia and five thousand in Botswana to new settlements that they were at times resettled at, especially in Zambia where frequent enemy attacks were a routine.

Bhebe says that, in 1978-79 both ZAPU and ZANU received Swedish assistance. ZAPU had its stations bombed, decimating over 300 refugees. During these atrocious bombings ZAPU's properties were wiped out. ZAPU needed the assistance to replenish its losses.¹⁹ In 1979, both ZAPU and ZANU received financial assistance to repatriate people to Zimbabwe and to feed refugees both in transit camps in Zimbabwe and those still remaining in Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia until the general elections in March 1980.²⁰

Other Nordic states which poured their invaluable assistance were Finland, Denmark and Norway which gave medicines, clothing and money as well as foodstuffs especially in the form of tinned food that guerrillas needed.

ZAPU-MPLA diplomatic relations.

Following the independence of Angola in 1975, ZAPU in 1976 established diplomatic relations with Angola and opened new training bases in Angola and a new channel of transporting their weapons was opened with the permission by MPLA which ZAPU had long cordial relations. Thompson buttresses this, she says that, the new Angolan government of MPLA provided some bases for training of ZAPU.²¹ Mbita, says that, in 1976 Nkomo informed OAU about the new transit route of Angola where most of ZAPU's weapons were to land before transiting to Zambia this meant that ZAPU was now less dependent on supplies from Tanzania whom they had sour diplomatic relations.²²

Petros posits that, after the 1976 unfruitful talks, Nkomo requested Kenneth Dube ZAPU's consul in USSR, to negotiate for intensified political and practical military support.²³ Apart from that, Mbita says that, Nkomo followed by visiting Moscow and requested the Soviets to train ZAPU's camp of 2000 persons from the Zambian front of 4000 persons for their fighters

inside Southern Rhodesia for general command and co-ordination. Nkomo's request included 4,000 Kalashnikovs, 1650 SKS Simonov self-loading carbines, 1100 pistols, rocket-propelled grenade launcher and rubber boats.²⁴ USSR responded positively and assisted ZAPU with the weapons they requested.²⁵ this was ensured possible by intricate diplomatic relations between Nkomo and the Soviets and the great persuasion by Kennel Dube.

Shubin stipulates that, as if that was enough Nkomo further requested for Soviet military instructors to Angola. Camps were established in eastern Angola with the assistance of the Cuban military, and Russia sent 12 officers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Penin in 1977.²⁶ In addition, Shubin asserts that, 14 more instructors were sent for sophisticated, strategic training, which encompassed use of recoilless guns, engineering, topography and fire-range equipment. Apart from that, Shubin asserts that, the last segment of Soviet trainers was led by Captain Ivan Dokai.²⁷ At this point ZAPU was now receiving foreign trainers in their training camps than before so as improve the training of ZPRA cadres. Shubin states that, ZAPU diplomatic relations were intensified such that, in Angola, ZAPU received 10 crews of T-34 tanks and BTR-152.²⁸ ZAPU continuously sent recruits ranging up to 2,000 to Angolan camps from Zambia. Cubans and Russians covered all ZAPU's training expenses and military exercises.²⁹

Shubin avers that, Angola's training camp suffered heavy losses in 1979, at the hands of combined Rhodesian and South African Air Forces which bombed the camp and claimed 192 ZAPU cadres.³⁰ Meanwhile Ben says that, following such inhuman horrendous offensive attacks, Angolan camps, were strengthened with some Strela anti-aircraft missiles and more sophisticated guns from USSR.³¹ According to Ben, ZAPU from that time received a special training he says that, dugouts were introduced so that the entire personnel, became well trained in various shooting ranges.³²

Nkomo became merciless and extremely radical about creating an invincible army to crush down the Smith regime. This is revealed when Nkomo constantly visited Moscow, to discuss determinedly military matters. Mbita avers that, ZAPU received more trainers from the USSR for advanced military training, including 20 pilots and 20 trainers for party security.³³ At this point Nkomo wanted to match Smith air force army and perhaps surpass its strength. Mbita stipulates that, various ground exercise were done at end of all training courses, which included crossing a water impediment which was essential,³⁴ as ZAPU fighters had to infiltrate cross the Zambezi. Furthermore, Mbengo says that, in 1978, ZAPU requested some Soviet military trainers, Colonel Lev Kononov was sent to Zambian training bases, and he intensified the training of regular conventional troops which had begun in the previous year.³⁵ According to Nkomo, by the end of the war ZAPU was having several tank crews, and even the complete flying and maintenance staff for a squadron of combat aircraft, who had passed out of Soviet training schools.³⁶ The rational of this advanced training was to provide qualified fighting men to crush Smith regime and perhaps take over the Zimbabwean armed forces after independence.³⁷ ZPRA combatants received the most sophisticated training to fight the Rhodesians.

Alexander says that, the intensification of war at late 1970s altered ZAPU's requirements, which meant that ZAPU cadres required new skills recruits that were sent in USSR in 1977, received new intelligence training which was matching the new demands of dealing with the influx of thousands recruits and refugees to Zambian camps.³⁸ ZAPU needed to provide effective selection so as to identify infiltrators. Consequently ZAPU had instituted NSO, a state-like body that obligated the party to train constabularies and border lookouts as well as extinguished bureaucrats.³⁹ This made ZAPU to become a formidable liberation tool.

ZAPU-Libya diplomatic relations. Petros posits that, diplomatic relations with Libya begun in 1975, first through Nkomo's negotiation and then maintained by Gordon Munyanyi

ZAPU's consul there up to the end of war.⁴⁰ Nkomo says that, after establishing diplomatic relations with Libya, as point of departure, two thousand ZPRA cadres were sent for training in Libya under Gaddafi's assistance.⁴¹ According to Nkomo, Gaddafi sent air crafts down to Zambia to ferry ZPRA recruits to Libya the planes were hired by Gaddafi from Bulgaria there ZPRA cadres were trained and given full kits of uniforms and weapons.⁴² ZAPU perpetual received substantial aid for its liberation effort. More and more cadres were sent in large figures on top the first largest group that was ferried to Libya.

Weapons acquired from USSR and other countries.

At first ZAPU received basic weapons for guerrilla use, they obtained small arms such as, the Simonov rifle and AKs. However, as struggle progressed and war intensified ZAPU received sophisticated destructive weaponries which were apt for combatants, at that point more AKs, heavy machine guns, war cars both small and big trucks, bridge laying mortars, small mortars and semi- missiles were obtained. At the verge of endeavouring to use large battalions formations to engage the enemy forces, ZAPU got equipped with highly sophisticated weapons like anti- air weapons such as strelas, t-35 tanks, more crossing vehicles and varied armaments as well as big mortars like the grade key equivalent to stallion mortars.

Impact of diplomatic relations.

ZAPU diplomatic relations played a significant role on armed struggle. Nkomo says that, great successes were made against the Rhodesian Air Force, using the Soviet air missiles, Sam-7s. ZAPU used these air missiles for defending off their camps in Zambia. The first time they used them they hit down two of the Rhodesian strike aircraft, the second time they got four such that by the end of war ZAPU had shot down nearly thirty Smith planes and helicopters⁴³ This was a positive impact as it forced Smith to import Hawker Hunters from

Israel, which was a huge expense.⁴⁴ Nkomo posits that, Smith admitted suffering enormous losses in the hands of ZAPU when ZPRA forces brought down two passenger planes.⁴⁵ Nkomo avers that, these planes were attacked upon realising that Smith used civil airliners equally for carrying both passengers and his troops. He says that, ZAPU was also avenging the horrendous atrocities that were carried by Smith at Mozambique where thousands of civilians were inhumanly decimated.⁴⁶ In the downing of a civilian plane 48 passengers were killed.⁴⁷ According to Nkomo, ZPRA guerrillas downed another passenger aircraft landing at Kariba to plant Smith military, of which ZPRA cadres had learnt the tactic and brought down the Air Rhodesia's Viscount.⁴⁸ Dabengwa argues that, without engagement in diplomatic relations to obtain support and supplies ZPRA forces could have not managed to execute the armed struggle. He says, it was the international backing that was indispensable for ZAPU's heavy military success.⁴⁹ ZAPU's diplomatic guard enabled the party to galvanise sophisticated logistical information. According to Bhebe, logistics became much developed at introduction of better expandable canoes and boats donated by the GDR, which were used to transport personnel reinforcements and military equipment across the Zambezi.⁵⁰ This was improved by introduction of radio communications in 1978 to platoon commanders. This enabled the establishment of effective communication with Lusaka Headquarters.⁵¹ Bhebe argues that, radio communications were further improved with attainment of the 3-9-3s which had a better capacity. Improved communication made it is easy to request quickly equipment and military reinforcements.⁵² These outstanding developments were achieved at the prize of establishing intricate diplomatic engagements. Diplomatic engagements constructed both visible and invisible sophisticated infrastructures for ZAPU which enhanced the efficiency of the guerrilla. ZPRA forces around 1978 and 1979 made major thrusts which saw them gaining some considerable upper hand over the Rhodesian forces in areas where ZPRA forces operated.⁵³ Archival source suggests that, ZPRA military prowess saw her dragging down

Smith government economical, socially and political. ZPRA strategic offenses like destruction of a fuel reservoir in Harare which burnt for about two weeks and the sabotages carried at Hwange and Kariba main power electrical supplies crippled many operations. These sabotages saw the whole nation going dark for several days. All these factors forced Smith to the negotiating table as victory was becoming certain for nationalist armies.⁵⁴ ZAPU cadres were now extensively equipped to cause much destruction.

Conclusion.

Intensive training of ZPRA cadres, both in Africa and in the Soviet Union as well as in GDR, Cuba and some other socialist countries made them skilful reliable fighters. Though the obtained equipment was not very contemporary, it was however, superior to armaments available in Rhodesia. Factual, much of the Soviet heavy weaponry, including tanks that were made available for ZPRA, were limitedly used in warfare, however, its presence and the subsequent attacks across the Zambezi forced Smith to the negotiation circle. ZAPU's transformed intricate diplomatic relations at post 1969-71 conflict enabled the party to train a huge army with weapons of mass destruction and produced a strong and efficient well trained militant cadres in neighbouring Zambia. ZAPU became a heavy weight giant waiting for certain victory. ZAPU was extensively prepared to catch the neck of the enemy army with devastating consequences. ZAPU expanded and invigorated its military activities to a point that it was now at the brink of military overrunning Rhodesia. Their military prowess and might became a huge threat to Smith force.

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CHAPTER FOUR: ZAPU'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OAU AND THE FRONT LINE STATES.

INTRODUCTION.

The previous chapter captured ZAPU's diplomatic relations after the 1969-1971 split. It also projected out what kind of assistance ZAPU received and how it contributed to the strengths of the party. It also showed how the assistance obtained enabled the party to sustain its liberation activities and costs that were associated with war damages. This chapter will address ZAPU's diplomatic relations with the continental board OAU, in detail as well as ZAPU's diplomatic relations with the regional board the FLS. Formation of ZIPA, Formation of PF, it will be concluded by analysing Lancaster House Agreement which ended the liberation war.

The OAU diplomatic strategy during the liberation struggle of Southern Africa.

OAU was formed on 25 May 1963, where independent African heads of states and governments met in Addis Ababa, and formed the Organisation of African Unity. Their major thrusts were hinged on establishing sound political, economic, social and cultural affairs development and cooperation amongst and between African boundaries. Most significantly OAU was mandated with a duty of spearheading the liberation struggle for countries that were under colonial yoke. OAU implemented a two-fold style upon liberation of Africa. This was mainly in the form diplomatic support and confrontation. Archival correspond states that, for the eradication of colonial forms of oppression against Africa, OAU was pragmatically supposed to pursue negotiations to liberate its self without bloodshed.¹ However, OAU was pretty aware of circumstances where bloodshed was inescapable due to the nature and complexity of some colonial racist governments. Africa knew the impossibilities of rectifying decolonisation in these territories based negotiation as sole strategy. Hence, OAU committed itself to supporting armed struggles whenever it was inevitable. OAU unwavering support

was revealed in establishment of the OAU liberation committee. According to Mbita, OAU was fully geared in making sure that whole of Africa was decolonised,

“reaffirms its support of nationalists of Southern Rhodesia and solemnly declared that if powers in Southern Rhodesia were to be usurped by a racial white minority government, state members of OAU would lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures which the African nationalist leaders may devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority.”²

OAU fully backed ZAPU through her diplomatic support in the fight against settler government. Factual, OAU opted for dialogue, however realising that negotiations alone would not lead to independence of Zimbabwe, support for armed struggle was an alternate strategy. This is reinforced by the Lusaka Manifesto, an indication of Africa’s desire by then to avoid bloodshed at any given opportunity.

“We have always preferred and we still prefer, to achieve African liberation without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipate were possible, in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.”³

It is clear that, strategically, use of violence for Africa was provisional. It was adopted to push settler governments to open doors of dialogue which were closed. Mbita says that, this approach came out of realization that the freedom fighters could not achieve outright victory from the battle field.⁴ Apart from that armed struggle was adopted as a tool to drag the enemy to quick achievements of decolonisation. It was also adopted strategy so as to induce hardships in governing unstable environment that was to push Smith into surrender.

OAU- Liberation Committee diplomatic roles.

Mbita avers that, the main tasks of the Liberation Committee were premised on the, assessment and evaluation of progress for Liberation Movements. As such, the liberation Committee advised and supervised liberation struggles. Apart from it mobilised support at the

international level.⁵ As such OAU position on issues of liberation struggle was internationalized. Ray avers that, the Liberation Committee was extensively involved in lobbying for ZAPU's material and financial assistance across the globe.⁶ Mbita posits that, the Liberation Committee mobilised local and international moral as well as diplomatic support for ZAPU so that the party participated effectively in the liberation struggle.⁷

As a result of OAU's prodigious diplomatic mobilisation various countries provided ZAPU with essential rear bases, training facilities and other special kinds of backing. OAU became a lifeblood and umbilical cord of ZAPU's survival by rendering of both immeasurable material and financial assistance. This was achieved by means of ZAPU's strong intricate diplomatic manoeuvres with OAU.

Mbita stipulates that, ZAPU benefited hugely from the Executive Secretariat arrangements for training of some ZAPU members in non-military professions.⁸ Ben posits that, this saw a lot of ZAPU cadres flying to Nigeria, Cuba and other western countries where vast knowledge was acquired on a plethora of professions, whereby some ZAPU persons trained as doctors, nurses, farmers, engineers, teachers, lecturers and so forth.⁹ Dabengwa states that, ZAPU received invaluable assistance from the Executive Secretariat of OAU, which assisted ZAPU members through arranging transit facilities for their freedom fighters.¹⁰ This was done after realizing the challenge that was faced by freedom fighters in entering and or transiting through independent African states in order to liberate Zimbabwe. This is further cemented by Clement, he says that, one would recall sour relations between ZAPU and Nyerere yet ZAPU's had her consul Akim Ndlovu in Tanzania and had its weapons being sent through Dar es Salaam this was made possible by the intricate diplomatic relations between ZAPU and OAU member states such that hostile relations with some OAU member states were by passed.¹¹

Meanwhile Mbengo buttresses the above notion, he stipulates that, the executive secretariat requested bordering countries to permit ZPRA forces to transit through their territories in order to intensify the liberation struggles.¹² Apart from that many ZAPU members obtained traveling documents that were prepared by OAU, for their freedom fighters and other Zimbabwean citizens so as to enable them to travel to places where they were supposed to receive their proper arranged training and studies.

Diplomatic role of the Frontline States.

Like OAU, the FLS states also played a pivotal diplomatic support for ZAPU. According to Thompson, Zimbabwe gained its independence, with the assistance of major players the FLS. Taken at her word value, Thompson submits that, Zimbabweans won their own independence, but they were not alone, the five neighbours that aided the Zimbabwean liberation movements, owe much to their own economic and political peril.¹³ The FLS assisted ZPRA forces with rear bases and training camps one in Tanzania, and most in Angola and Zambia were ZPRA forces were highly concentrated.¹⁴ She goes to say, FLS provided, medicines, food staffs, clothing, logistical support and sanctuaries for refugees.¹⁵ ZAPU was also a beneficiary of FLS of these material and diplomatic support. Thompson stipulates that, equally important, they initiated the negotiating conferences that eventually led to Lancaster House.¹⁶ Meanwhile Sibanda states that, the Front Line States helped the nationalists work through some of their differences and find ways to present a united front to Smith across the negotiating table.¹⁷

Formation of ZIPA.

According to Sibanda, ZIPA was a direct offshoot of combined ZPRA and ZANLA forces under the auspices of FLS initiatives. This was done so as to present a strong united military force against the Smith army as well as to reduce costs of supplying two armies from the

pocket of OAU which was in most cases running short of funds and incapable of giving enough funds to both ZPRA and ZANLA forces.¹⁸ The FLS got motivated by serious negative balance that Smith was supposed to raise to maintain the war. According to Lake, to support the Smith forces, around 1975 and 1976 Smith, needed \$95 million of expenditure.¹⁹ Sibanda says that, to FLS this clearly meant the transfer of political power to the black nationalists was now at blink of an eye, but a matter of time. As such the FLS sought to combine Zimbabwean liberation forces so as to offer Smith a formidable force, to intensify pressure to their adversary government.²⁰ This formidable army going to be used as final blow to crush Smith forces if Smith most probably yielded not to the peace settlement. Thompson avers that, the FLS thought that a successful guerrilla struggle required some joint military operation. This was easily attained as Nyerere and Machel were willing to provide training camps and rear base.²¹ In 1975, therefore the ZANLA and ZPRA forces formed ZIPA. Nyerere opened Nachingwea for five thousand recruits, half ZANLA and half ZPRA.²² This marked the first attempt of combined military co-ordination under the support of the FLS. This military alliance was to get funding from OAU and FLS thereby assisting also ZPRA forces to obtain more funds and access training bases in Tanzania as well as obtain a launch base in Mozambique.

Principles and governance of ZIPA.

After the formation of ZIPA, ZIPA was to operate on a principle of Joint Military Command which was formed to direct the activities of this united force. ZIPA was to operate largely from Mozambique, and some independent ZPRA elements in Zambia under the auspices of ZIPA. Though it short-lived, by the end of December of that year, Maringapasi says that, ZIPA had positive achievements it successful managed to infiltrate via Gaza and Tete and had disrupted communication links with South Africa. Both places were under ZPRA and ZANLA commanders and their chief was Machel whom they reported about the progress of

the war.²³ Correspondents from a ZPRA combat diary states that, ZIPA's geographic distribution of operation is eloquent proof of the strength of the revolutionary forces. The gallant forces struck deep into the highlands of Beitbridge right in between the two enemies of the people of Southern Africa, Smith and Volster, and managed to penetrate right into the strategic steel manufacturing and chrome processing areas of Que Que and Gwelo respectively so as to cause economic instability and force Smith to surrender.²⁴ Furthermore, ZPRA correspondent says that, within a short period of survival ZIPA-ZPRA forces killed more than 500 soldiers, wounded about 1000 counted enemy soldiers, destroyed more than 88 military trucks, downed two helicopters, shot 1 spotter plane and captured 50 enemy soldiers. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition were captured.²⁵ These figures demonstrated the developments of war in favour of the revolutionary armies.

Demise of ZIPA.

Although OAU and the FLS viewed ZIPA optimistically, Sibanda posits that, Nyerere called it a new force that has emerged in Zimbabwe.²⁶ However, the jubilation over the unity was short lived, as ZAPU refused to dance anymore to ill-treatment in Tanzania. Thompson further cements this she says that, at Kingolwira and Mgagao in Tanzania, fighting had broken out with some deaths on both sides. By August most of the ZPRA forces had returned to Lusaka. ZIPA became mainly ZANLA. The fighting was over loyalty to each group's leaders but also about the tactics of warfare.²⁷ Tanzania had Chinese instructors in the camps, and their strategy conflicted with what ZPRA had been trained by the Soviets.

Apart from that, Dabengwa believes that ZANLA's indiscipline strengthened the tensions between the two forces. According to Dabengwa, disciplined ZPRA commanders were taken by surprise upon finding out that ZANLA deployed cadres that were not well trained or even completely untrained. Some recruits were trained using sticks and only to be given a gun on the day of crossing into Rhodesia. Most of these masses were systematically literally

butchered by the enemy.²⁸ As a result of this ZPRA cadres further resented the military alliance as they could not send their trained cadres to fight with untrained men. Meanwhile Ray avers that, by the end of 1975 ZPRA elements were extremely maltreated within the alliance, some being shot in cold blood by ZANLA forces in Mozambique and Tanzania. So they had to escape and return to their original bases in Zambia.²⁹ ZIPA achievements were soon forgotten and thrown in the dust bin of history. Sibanda says that, the most glaring problem with the unity was that it favoured ZANU, hence making it a marriage of inconvenience. For its top leader came from ZANU and the FLS leader who directed and hosted it was a strong supporter of ZANU.³⁰

Patriotic Front.

According to Thompson, the fall of ANC organisation and the split of ZIPA, influenced the FLS states to call a conference in September 1976 in Dar es Salaam to once again unite the leaders of liberation parties.³¹ The FLS, declared their support for a united political front. As such, on 8 October 1976, the Patriotic Front was formed between ZANU and ZAPU, it however it survived despite various conflicts and differences in the ideological orientation until the attainment of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. In addition Sibanda states that, PF despite it being chiefly a marriage of inconvenience, the PF was effective in peace negotiations.³² Thompson posits that, on 9 January 1977, the FLS gave its full diplomatic recognition to the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. On 7 February 1977, the OAU Liberation Committee also gave its full diplomatic recognition to the Patriotic Front.³³ These formal diplomatic recognition were essential, for it meant that OAU liberation funds would then be allocated to the Patriotic Front. As such ZAPU was now receiving diplomatic aid from the OAU via the PF.

The UANC of Abel Muzorewa, was side-lined by FLS and OAU, the Patriotic Front became the sole legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwean people. Thompson argues that, the

political unity formed with the assistance of the FLS was absolutely vital to the negotiated settlement, as Smith had unscrupulously managed to settle a devious settlement, with Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau.³⁴ Though the united PF, the FLS victoriously argued that the internal settlement excluded the liberation powers that were concerned. Hence, Muzorewa got failed in legitimising his power. Thompson avers that, the FLPs diplomatically played the game on the side of ZAPU and ZANU, the FLS quickly moved to obtain international recognition of the PF as the legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people.³⁵ Their role was crucial to the rejection of the Muzorewa internal settlement at international community as no real change in power took place. In this light, the PF unity and their ability to sustain the war convinced the international community to reject the neo-colonial state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Thompson further avers that, finally the diplomatic achievements of the PF of ZAPU and ZANU, supported by the FLS, can be appreciated by contrasting Muzorewa's settlement against the Lancaster agreement.³⁶ The PF victory was two-fold. It won a constitution that gave the majority-rule government an overwhelming political victory at elections that abolished minority white rule.

The Lancaster House and the Independence of Zimbabwe.

Mbita says that, in August 1979, the OAU met at Lusaka and crafted the procedures for Zimbabwe's settlement of peace. They deliberated on a plan of how to proceed with the achievement of a negotiated settlement which was to bring the fighting to an end and create the necessary mechanisms for the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe.³⁷ Kriger avers that, Britain invited the two teams, the Rhodesian government and the Patriotic Front.³⁸ This was strongly endorsed by other powerful actors, USA, OAU, Commonwealth and the FLS. Mbita posits that, in implementing the OAU and commonwealth plan, a constitutional conference on Rhodesia was agreed to place at Lancaster House in London and begun from 10 September to 21 December 1979 when the agreement was signed.³⁹ This historic

conference was chaired by the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington. At the end of hard bargaining an agreement was reached, which included an interim government and ceasefire arrangements and finally the elections. Lord Christopher Soames became appointed as governor of the colony to supervise and implement the Lancaster House Agreement.⁴⁰ The picture below shows the end of the liberation struggle after strong deliberations in the Lancaster House negotiations. Cease fire was to be monitored by collective security forces under G. P. Walls until elections were over.

TO ALL ZIPRA FORCES

A GUARANTEE FROM THE COMMANDER OF COMBINED OPERATIONS



In accordance with the instructions I have received from the Government:

I guarantee the safety of all ZIPRA Forces who wish to return home before the Elections. You will come to no harm at the hands of the Security Forces. You will be fed and clothed and given proper medical treatment. If you so wish, arrangements will be made for your transfer to the Interim Government Auxiliaries (Umkonto waBantu) under the command of Combined Operations. The Umkonto waBantu already have many ex-ZIPRA Forces working with them. You will be supplied with your own weapon and will be allowed to choose your area of operation. If you wish to be reunited with your family and operate in their area, this can be arranged. You will be allowed to participate with no restriction in the April Elections. This will enable you to play an important part in the establishment of the first black Majority Rule Government in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

Come home before the Elections in April 1979, and I guarantee you a safe return.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. P. Walls'.

LT. GEN. G. P. WALLS, G.L.M., D.C.D., M.B.E.

THIS MEANS ...

"That any member of the ZIPRA Forces who returns home in peace before the election will be well treated. They will be fed, clothed and given proper medical treatment. They will be integrated with the Interim Government Auxiliaries (Umkonto waBantu) under the command of Combined Operations, and will be armed for this purpose. On no account will those returning members of the ZIPRA Forces be stopped from voting in the elections in April, should they wish to do so."

Conclusion.

ZAPU's had intricate diplomatic relations with OAU and the FLS that enabled the party to participate in the liberation war. Through the intricate diplomatic relations that ZAPU established with OAU, the party managed to access training bases in Tanzania despite sour diplomatic relations that ZAPU had with Nyerere. ZAPU benefited a lot from OAU liberation committee and executive secretariat which organised resources both humanitarian and hardware material for ZAPU. ZAPU's diplomatic relations with the OAU and the FLS benefited the party access rear bases, logistical support and training for guerrillas, as well as sanctuaries for her refugees. The party also managed to broadcast further what was known as the Rhodesian problem through these structures who advocated for the decolonisation of Zimbabwe at international level. ZAPU benefited again from FLS and OAU diplomatically engagement which blocked the recognition of the Muzorewa Smith government a trap which was set by Smith regime to rule Zimbabwe through a back door and attempted to undermine the nationalist liberation movement cause for armed struggle. Most important ZAPU's diplomatic relations with FLS and OAU saw the formation of the PF which final negotiated the Lancaster House agreement which marked the end the protracted liberation war and ushered the political independence of Zimbabwe.

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39. H. Mbita, *A Project of Countries and Regions outside SADC and International organisation, Contemporary Documents 1960-1994*, p416.
40. Ibid, pp416-417.

Conclusion.

ZAPU's diplomatic relations during the liberation struggle will be incomplete without bringing into light the names of ZAPU diplomats who canvassed for all the necessary assistance that ZAPU needed during the liberation struggle. Mbengo avers that in Mozambique ZAPU was represented by Phelekezela Report Mpoko, while in Zambia ZAPU's diplomats were Dumiso Dabengwa and Jack Ngwenya, in Algeria there was Charles Chikerema, in Nigeria Simon Khaya was the envoi, in Tanzania there was Akim Ndlovu and Sijabuliso/ Jabulani Moyo, in Botswana there was Ethan Dube, in the PLO, Egypt and Arab countries Steven Nkomo and T G Silundika were the representatives they were based at Baghdad in Iraq and Cairo in Egypt respectively. Furthermore, Mbengo says that, in Angola ZAPU was represented by Ndiweni and Ben Matiwanza, in Cuba there was Zvangabi Dube, while in the Scandinavian countries Frank Mbengo was the consul, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria Nimbrose Muntinhiri was the ambassador, in Russia Kennel Dube was the envoi and in Rumania and Poland there was Kennel Chirinda whilst in North America and Canada Kalistas Ndlovu represented ZAPU and in the GDR Magayisa Ndinda was ZAPU's diplomat. Mbengo further alludes that, in UK ZAPU's ambassador was Arthur Chadzingwa whilst in Libya ZAPU was represented by Gordon Munyanyi. Worth mentioning is the fact that ZAPU diplomatic engagement were fundamental laid by Joshua Nkomo's travels during the early 1960s and then sent the aforementioned diplomats after 1965 to go and organise support for ZAPU when it was clear that independence was not going to be achieved by negotiations only but through a protracted war. It was the prodigious diplomatic ability of these consuls which saw ZAPU gaining intensive support from OAU, PLO, FLS, None Aligned Movement, Common Wealth nations, Arab nations and Socialist countries, Scandinavian countries, North America and Canada. These diplomats organised adequate and necessary support for ZAPU, such that the party managed to participate efficiently and effectively in the

liberation of Zimbabwe from the clutches of imperialism and fascism. They played an invaluable role. The strength of ZAPU's representatives in facilitating and coordinating international support was hinged on the nature of ZAPU's system of recruitment which drew most members from urban areas most of whom were educated hence when they were recruited for diplomatic roles, most of them produced excellent results. Without the support they organised from OAU Liberation Committee, the FLS, and Commonwealth nations and so forth, the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe would not have developed to its state. The diplomatic role that was played by these consuls assisted ZAPU as a liberation movement to successfully attain the goal of liberating Zimbabwe. ZAPU's consuls made immense crusade for international support which paid invaluable contribution in the form of superior weapons like semi-missiles, Strelas, T-35 tanks and bridge laying vehicles. They also organised humanitarian support, which assisted the party to cover expenses that were associated with war catastrophes. These consuls also exhibited a benchmark of excellence in establishing intricate diplomatic relations as they managed to appeal to the international community to impose sanctions to the Smith regime, though partial sanctions were imposed it increased pressure on the colonial government to grant political independence to black majority. ZAPU's intricate diplomatic relations enabled the party to maintain a military presence in the operational theatre in Rhodesia in varying ways, it nurtured a calibre of partial invisible fighting cadres, offered ZAPU training services and gave vast knowledge that ZAPU cadres needed both during the war and after the war. Mostly important ZAPU's intricate diplomatic relations enabled the party to fight the colonial system through direct and indirect means. ZAPU's backers fought the colonial system indirectly by challenging Britain to solve the Rhodesian problem while they empowered ZAPU's military apparatus to conduct the physical fight. Indeed ZAPU's diplomatic relations played an immeasurable significant role in the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe.

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